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INTRODUCTION

It is well established that the First Amendment’s free speech clause
does not protect the production or exchange of real child pornography—
material that exhibits the real abuse or sexual conduct of children.1 However,
virtual child pornography, where no real children are required for its
production, is still a widely contended topic among courts.2 Although
seemingly simple, this subject walks a fine line between the protection of free
speech and the public interest in protecting children from abuse.3 With the
overwhelming advancements in editing and digital technology, there have
undoubtedly been new obstacles for lawmakers and prosecutors in terms of
creating laws to control this issue.4 These advancements have made it difficult
to distinguish between what images contain real children and what images
contain, so called, fake children or some other hybrid form.5
There are three general categories of virtual child pornography.6 The
first is computer-generated child pornography, which is made without the use
of real children or images of real children.7 Therefore, the children depicted
in these sorts of films are completely fictional and fabricated.8 The second is
child pornography that is created with the use of youthful-looking adults who
role play as children.9 Both are considered legal, as the first does not involve
the harming or use of real children and the second involves films or images
between consenting adults.10 The focus of this Comment is on the third
category—morphed child pornography—a subject that falls in the middle of
what is considered real child pornography and completely computer-generated
child pornography.11 Morphing is developed by using actual photos or videos
1.
Shepard Liu, Ashcroft, Virtual Child Pornography and First Amendment
Jurisprudence, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 1, 2 (2007); U.S. CONST. amend. I.
2.
Liu, supra note 1, at 3; United States v. Mecham, 950 F.3d 257, 260 (5th
Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 139 (2020).
3.
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245 (2002).
4.
David L. Hudson Jr., Virtual Child Pornography, FREEDOM F. INST.,
http://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/first-amendment-center/topics/freedom-of-speech2/internet-first-amendment/virtual-child-pornography/ (last updated Sept. 18, 2017).
5.
Id.
6.
Liu, supra note 1, at 2.
7.
Id. at 3.
8.
See id.
9.
Id. at 2.
10.
Virginia F. Milstead, Note, Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition: How Can
Virtual Child Pornography Be Banned Under the First Amendment?, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 825,
834–35 (2004).
11.
Liu, supra note 1, at 2; United States v. Mecham, 950 F.3d 257, 260 (5th
Cir. 2020), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 139 (2020).
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of children, which can then be digitally manipulated to create an entirely
different sexualized image.12 For example, this can be accomplished by
superimposing the faces of children onto the bodies of adults engaging in
sexual conduct.13 With these methods, there are many ways that a child
predator could use superimpositions to create child porn.14
Circuit courts have disagreed on whether morphed child pornography
should be categorized as a protected speech, since it seems to be the middle
ground between what has historically been unprotected and what is still
considered protected under the First Amendment.15 In February 2020, United
States v. Mecham16 brought the issue before the Fifth Circuit.17 The Fifth
Circuit acknowledged the arguments on both sides, but ultimately joined the
Second and Sixth Circuits in its decision to exclude morphing from First
Amendment protection.18 More importantly, the court in Mecham dissected
and rejected the main argument brought forth in the Eighth Circuit, which
supports that morphing should be categorized as protected speech.19 Further,
the Supreme Court decided not to review the decision in United States v.
Mecham.20 Thus, the Supreme Court has failed to guide courts on how to
address this issue uniformly.21
This Comment will discuss the legislative history of child
pornography, the different cases and arguments surrounding the current circuit
split, and the newest case to add an opinion on the issue of morphed child
pornography.22 Ultimately, this Comment will argue that morphed child
pornography should not fall within the protections of the First Amendment
and that the absence of clear precedent on this issue, along with conflicting
arguments across circuits calls for judicial review at the Supreme Court level.23

12.
Liu, supra note 1, at 3.
13.
Mecham, 950 F.3d at 260.
14.
See id.
15.
See id. at 265.
16.
950 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2020).
17.
Id. at 257.
18.
Id. at 265.
19.
See id. at 266–67.
20.
141 S. Ct. 139 (2020) (cert. denied) (referring to United States v. Mecham,
950 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2020)).
21.
See id.
22.
See infra Parts III, IV, V.
23.
See infra Part VI.
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THE SOCIETAL IMPACT OF VIRTUAL CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

The sexual abuse and exploitation of children through child
pornography has always been a significant national concern.24 Unfortunately,
the internet has created new avenues for child abusers to commit crimes behind
the comfort of their screens.25 According to the United States Sentencing
Commission, more than half of all internet child pornography content is of
infants and toddlers.26 Thus, not only does internet child pornography exploit
the weakest members of our society, but it also creates a forum in which abuse
is permanent and can be further circulated.27 Children who fall victim to any
form of child pornography on the internet experience extreme emotional and
psychological harm.28 Child pornography has shown to be a new form of
abuse since child molesters no longer have to physically abuse their victims.29
Instead, they can easily manipulate child victims into performing acts or
posing for a camera, which can later be used for sexual purposes.30 Victims
of this abuse often suffer from anxiety, depression, isolation, and may even
develop their own sexual behavioral issues.31 For obvious reasons, the most
negative outcomes appear in individuals who have experienced abuse from a
father figure or have experienced abuse for a long duration of time.32
Similarly, victims whose images have circulated the web experience
deep shame and embarrassment at the thought that someone will recognize
them from images of their abuse.33 As a result, victims of child pornography
are forced to relive their abuse over and over again.34 Clinical psychologists
note that many victims struggle to identify a time when their abuse ended and
cannot find closure, even as adults.35
24.
25.

New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 757 (1982).
RICHARD WORTLEY & STEPHEN SMALLBONE, INTERNET CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY: CAUSES, INVESTIGATIONS, AND PREVENTION 2 (Graeme R. Newman ed., 2012).
26.
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, FEDERAL SENTENCING OF CHILD PORNOGRAPHY
NON-PRODUCTION SENTENCES 4 (2021), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/researchand-publications/research-publications/2021/20210629_Non-Production-CP.pdf; Emily Riley,
Internet Blamed for Increase in Child Porn, CRIME REP. (June 29, 2021),
http://thecrimereport.org/2021/06/29/internet-blamed-for-increase-in-child-porn/.
27.
Sarah Sternberg, Note, The Child Pornography Prevention Act of 1996 and
the First Amendment: Virtual Antitheses, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2783, 2785 (2001).
28.
Id.
29.
WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 25, at 75.
30.
Id.
31.
Id. at 72.
32.
Id. at 73.
33.
Id. at 77.
34.
See WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 25, at 77.
35.
See id. at 77.
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Aside from the various harms imposed on victims, child pornography
acts as a tool for child molesters to seduce children into normalizing sexual
activity with adults.36 Child molesters may use materials to persuade children
into participating in creating sexual images which can be utilized to lure more
child victims.37 Child pornography viewers may also find support and
encouragement in groups or forums that engage in the same content; fortythree percent of offenders have participated in some sort of an internet child
pornography community.38 The effects that child pornography has on its
viewers are equally harmful.39 When enacting child pornography legislation,
Congress acknowledged that pedophiles use this content to self-gratify and
stimulate their sexual appetites.40
Similarly, almost all pedophiles collect some sort of child
pornography in an attempt to fulfill their fantasies or to collect ideas to
perpetuate abuse.41 In 2019, forty-eight percent of child pornography
offenders, who were not charged with its production, committed some sort of
“aggravating sexual conduct” before, or at the same time, as their offense.42
These statistics comparatively increased from studies conducted in 2010,
showing that there has been a steady incline in abrasive conduct by child
pornographic viewers.43 Experts have described child pornography as an
addiction for pedophiles.44 The addiction eventually intensifies and requires
the individual to search for more graphic and explicit content to continue to
achieve arousal.45 Repeated exposure to the same stimuli will eventually
require new content for the viewer’s stimulation.46 Thus, the user becomes
desensitized to the content, no matter how extreme.47 Additionally, child
pornography viewers often experience a worsening of their personal
relationships and problems.48 One-third of people arrested for child
pornography offenses between 2001 and 2006 were actively living with their
significant other and experienced such issues.49
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Sternberg, supra note 27, at 2786.
Id.
Riley, supra note 26.
WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 25, at 82.
Sternberg, supra note 27, at 2786 (citing S REP. NO. 104-358, at 12 (1996)).
Id. (citing S REP. NO. 104-358, at 13).
U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 26, at 6; Riley, supra note 26.
See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, supra note 26, at 6; Riley, supra note 26.
Sternberg, supra note 27, at 2786.
Id. at 2786–87.
WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 25, at 83.
Sternberg, supra note 27, at 2787.
WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 25, at 82.
Id.
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The profitability and demand for different types of child pornography
are what drive the market, a market that likely holds billions of dollars.50 The
fact that the distribution of this content is international poses an enormous
challenge for its regulation and control.51 For example, an image can be
created in Asia, held in a server in Europe, and be accessed by an offender in
North America.52 Most of the time, child sexual abuse material is being
investigated in the present jurisdiction where it is occurring.53 However, when
those materials cross jurisdictional boundaries, it becomes difficult for police
departments and investigators to share that information.54 Additionally,
different countries have different laws pertaining to child pornography and its
derivatives.55 For example, Australia and the European Union have already
gone as far as to outlaw all virtual child pornography, even fully computergenerated material.56 On the other hand, in the United States, certain types of
virtual child pornography are still constitutionally protected.57 Prices for this
content in the industry rarely decrease and because the chances of getting
caught are less likely on the internet, child pornographic producers have no
interest in stopping.58
Computers, cellphones, and other technological advancements have
allowed for the expansion of child pornographic material.59 Morphing
software enables individuals to combine real images of children with
pornographic images of adults.60 Thus, the reality is that real children are no
longer needed to produce child pornography.61 In fact, because most child
pornography is produced by family members or individuals who are close to
the children, many victims would not even be aware that they are being used
in pornographic contents.62 Consequently, when the digital age changes the
way child pornography is made, child pornography laws deserve a second
look.63
50.
Sternberg, supra note 27, at 2787.
51.
WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 25, at 2.
52.
See id.
53.
See id.
54.
See id.
55.
Id.
56.
WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 25, at 5.
57.
Milstead, supra note 10, at 834–35.
58.
See Sternberg, supra note 27, at 2787.
59.
Brian G. Slocum, Virtual Child Pornography: Does It Mean the End of the
Child Pornography Exception to the First Amendment?, 14 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 637, 641
(2004).
60.
Sternberg, supra note 27, at 2788.
61.
Id. at 2788–89.
62.
WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 25, at 72, 74.
63.
Sternberg, supra note 27, at 2789.
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HISTORY OF REGULATIONS SURROUNDING REAL AND VIRTUAL
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY IN THE UNITED STATES

Although the sexual abuse and exploitation of children are as old as
humanity itself, internet child pornography is a relatively new phenomenon.64
The miniature boom of child pornography occurred around the 1960s, as
obscenity laws in other countries loosened.65 For the first time, the United
States set forth regulations to outlaw child pornography and to prohibit its
importation.66 By the 1980s, the internet had exponentially increased the
amount of child pornography that was being produced and traded.67 However,
virtual child pornography, particularly morphed content, is what has become
known as the legal gray area of this topic.68 The only piece of legislation that
sought to regulate virtual child pornography in the United States was
introduced in 1996, as the Child Pornography Prevention Act (“CPPA”),
which was later overturned in 2002.69
A.

The Miller Standard and its Application to Child Pornography

In 1973, Miller v. California70 created the current standard of review
for obscenity.71
Although not directly relating to restricting child
pornography, Miller made an important distinction on what type of
pornography is considered obscene.72 Under the Miller test, the guidelines to
determine whether material is obscene must be:
(a) [W]hether ‘the average person, applying contemporary
community standards’ would find that the work, taken as a whole,
appeals to the prurient interest, . . . (b) whether the work depicts or
describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken

64.
WORTLEY & SMALLBONE, supra note 25, at 1.
65.
Id.
66.
Id.
67.
Id. at 2.
68.
United States v. Mecham, 950 F.3d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 2020), cert. denied,
141 S. Ct. 139 (2020).
69.
Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA) of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208,
§ 121, 110 Stat. 3009-26, invalidated by Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
70.
413 U.S. 15 (1973).
71.
Id. at 24.
72.
Id. at 36–37.
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as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific
value.73

Although this test would certainly include some sort of child
pornography, by nature it would not include all of them.74 It would be even
less likely that it includes child pornography that falls in the gray area of what
is considered real and fake.75 Because the Court in Miller failed to categorize
child pornography as inherently obscene, future decisions were bound to be
made to specifically attack this issue.76
B.
New York v. Ferber: Child Pornography as a Compelling State
Interest
In 1982, New York v. Ferber77 established that child pornography is
not protected by the First Amendment’s guarantee of free expression.78 In
addition, the Supreme Court clarified that the government has a compelling
interest in prosecuting individuals who partake in the creation of child
pornography, as the sexual exploitation and abuse of children has always been
a national concern.79 Ultimately, the standards set forth in Miller were
irrelevant to the issues of child pornography, as Miller only established that
adult pornography was protected under the First Amendment, so long as the
materials were not obscene.80 Generally, Miller defined obscenity as images
lacking “serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.”81 Ultimately,
Ferber determined that the Miller case could not be used to examine the
material of children engaging in sexual conduct and therefore, child
pornography did not require proof of obscenity.82
In Ferber, the defendant sold two sexually explicit films to an
undercover police officer.83 The films depicted young boys engaging in sexual
acts.84 Under New York law, “[a] person is guilty of promoting a sexual
performance by a child when, knowing the character and content thereof, he
73.
Id. at 24.
74.
See id. at 27.
75.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 27.
76.
United States v. Mecham, 950 F.3d 257, 261–62 (5th Cir. 2020), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 139 (2020); see also Miller, 413 U.S. at 16.
77.
458 U.S. 747 (1982).
78.
See id. at 764.
79.
See id. at 760–61.
80.
Id. at 761; see Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
81.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
82.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761; see Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
83.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 751–52.
84.
Id. at 752.
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produces, directs or promotes any performance which includes sexual conduct
by a child less than sixteen years of age.”85 Therefore, the defendant was
convicted at the trial level under the New York statute.86 However, because
the statute did not require the obscenity standard set forth by Miller, the
defendant claimed the statute was overly broad and appealed his convictions.87
The Appellate Division of the New York Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court’s convictions.88 However, the New York Court of Appeals agreed with
the defendant and reversed the convictions on the grounds that the statute
violated the First Amendment.89 The Supreme Court of the United States
granted the state’s petition for certiorari.90
The Supreme Court presented five compelling government interests
that justified the ban of non-obscene child pornography.91 First, the Court
emphasized the importance of safeguarding the “physical and psychological
well-being” of children.92 Even when laws have shown the possibility of
imposing on some area of constitutionally protected rights, the Court has
sustained legislation that has protected youth.93 Second, child pornographic
films and photographs impose direct and continuous harm on the children
involved.94 Digital pornographic materials allow for a permanent record of a
child’s involvement that negatively impacts the child’s life with every
circulation.95 Third, there is an economic motive and a continuous demand for
the production of such films.96 Thus, allowing any remnant of protections for
child pornography would essentially be the Court’s promotion of illegal
activity.97 In the same manner, the Court suggested that the constitutional
freedom of speech and freedom of press does not excuse the use of speech and
writing that directly contributes to crime and illegality.98 Fourth, cases where
depictions of children engaging in sexual conduct are used for scientific or
educational work are unlikely.99 Therefore, there is little value in protecting
non-obscene child pornography for the purpose of protecting the few and rare
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

Id. at 751.
Id. at 752.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 752–53; see Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 752.
See id.
Id. at 753.
Id. at 756–57, 759, 761–63.
Id. at 756–57.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 757.
Id. at 759.
Id.
Id. at 761.
See id. at 761–62.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 761–62.
Id. at 762–63.
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instances where it would be acceptable.100 Fifth, the negative impact that child
pornography has on children is substantial, and therefore outweighs the
concerns for First Amendment protection.101 For these reasons, the Court held
that New York’s statute was not overbroad.102 Almost half of all states at the
time of Ferber were enforcing legislation that directly targeted child
pornography without the obscenity standards set forth by Miller.103
Ultimately, the case seemed to focus on the types of harms that child
pornography causes.104 The physical and psychological harms that are
imposed on children who are the subjects of child pornography exemplify a
direct injury.105 This direct harm is also present when these pornographic
materials are continuously distributed and that child’s trauma is further
exasperated.106 The Court also considers the indirect harms of child
pornography.107 Child abuse is at the core of all child pornography.108 For
example, pedophiles often utilize child pornography to seduce their victims
into engaging in sexual activity.109 The Court in Ferber even proposes that
the eradication of the child pornography market would likely prevent the
infliction of harm on other children.110 Thus, preventing the direct and indirect
harm of children is in the interest of the state.111
The Court successfully recognized that child pornography, whether
obscene or not, should be prohibited.112 The consensus was that the First
Amendment’s protections became of smaller importance when held in
comparison to the societal damage that child pornography produces for the
Nation.113 However, the focus of the case was dedicated to real child
pornography, that is pornography that captures the actual abuse of a child,
whereas the more elusive issue of virtual child pornography was not directly
addressed.114 Instead, the Court suggests that “other depictions of sexual
conduct, not otherwise obscene, which do not involve live performance or
photographic or other visual reproduction of live performances, retains First
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 762.
See id. at 764.
Id. at 774.
Ferber, 458 U.S. at 749; see Miller, 413 U.S. at 24.
See Liu, supra note 1, at 8–9.
Id.
Id. at 8.
See id. at 9.
Id.
See Liu, supra note 1, at 9.
See id.
Liu, supra note 1, at 9.
See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756 (1982).
See id. at 758.
See Liu, supra note 1, at 10.
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Amendment protection.”115 This rhetoric creates a loophole in both the way
that child pornography can avoid regulation and the way that child
pornographic content creators can experiment with images and videos to give
the illusion that children are engaging in sexual conduct, when, in fact, there
is no live performance taking place.116 The decision in Ferber was expanded
in 1990 with Osborne v. Ohio,117 which made it illegal to possess child
pornography.118 Furthermore, the Court in Osborne expressly listed the use of
child pornography in the seduction process as a valid reason for the state to
encourage the destruction of these materials as well as the criminalization of
their possession.119 However, over time, the absence of clear precedent on
virtual child pornography brought about the introduction of the CPPA.120
C.

Virtual Child Pornography
1.

The CPPA

In 1996, Congress sought to regulate virtual child pornography with
the CPPA.121 The CPPA defined child pornography as:
(A) the production of such visual depiction involves the use of a
minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; (B) such visual
depiction is [] [a digital image, computer image, or computergenerated image that is, or is indistinguishable from, that] of a minor
engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (C) such visual depiction
has been created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable
minor is engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or (D) such visual
depiction is advertised, promoted, presented, described, or
distributed in such a manner that conveys the impression that the
material is or contains a visual depiction of a minor engaging in
sexually explicit conduct.122
115.
116.
117.
118.

Ferber, 458 U.S. at 765.
See Liu, supra note 1, at 10.
495 U.S. 103 (1990).
YAMAN AKDENIZ, INTERNET CHILD PORNOGRAPHY AND THE LAW:
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 95 (2008); Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111; see Ferber,
458 U.S. at 748.
119.
AKDENIZ, supra note 118, at 96; Osborne, 495 U.S. at 111.
120.
Liu, supra note 1, at 10; see Child Pornography Prevention Act § 121, 110
Stat. at 3009–27.
121.
Liu, supra note 1, at 14; see Child Pornography Prevention Act § 121, 110
Stat. at 3009–27.
122.
Liu, supra note 1, at 14; Child Pornography Prevention Act § 121, 110 Stat.
at 3009–28.
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Essentially, the CPPA broadened the scope of the ban set by Ferber
by covering actual child pornography, as well as all three categories of virtual
child pornography.123 The ultimate goal of the CPPA was to destroy the
market for child pornography, protect child victims, and prevent child
molesters from feeding into sexual desires that could result in the
manifestation of criminal activity.124 By outlawing computer images that
appeared to be real children, the CPPA casted a broad net and in the process
was able to rectify the loopholes left by the Ferber decision.125
2.

Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition

Soon after the introduction of the CPPA, Ashcroft v. Free Speech
Coalition126 reversed the Act in 2002.127 The Supreme Court in Ashcroft found
that virtual child pornography was not a compelling government interest, and
that the CPPA was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague.128 Ultimately, the
Court held that virtual child pornography was protected under the First
Amendment.129 Particularly, Ashcroft focused on the unconstitutionality of
the Act’s language, such as the phrases “appears to be” and “conveys the
impression.”130 The concern was that this language would allow the
prosecution of individuals who created their materials without the use of real
children.131 Hypothetically, if a producer created a film in which he or she
used a youthful-looking adult movie actor to play the role of a child, then that
producer could possibly face punishments under the CPPA.132 Similarly, this
language would technically prohibit all virtual child pornography despite its
possible literary, artistic, or scientific value.133 For example, the Court cited
Academy Award-winning movies, such as American Beauty, in which there
123.
See Liu, supra note 1, at 14; Child Pornography Prevention Act § 121, 110
Stat. at 3009–28; New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 748 (1982).
124.
Liu, supra note 1, at 15; Child Pornography Prevention Act § 121, 110 Stat.
at 3009–27.
125.
See Liu, supra note 1, at 15; Child Pornography Prevention Act § 121, 110
Stat. at 3009–28; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 748.
126.
535 U.S. 234 (2002).
127.
But see Child Pornography Prevention Act, § 121, 110 Stat. at 3009-28;
Liu, supra note 1, at 32.
128.
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 256 (2002); Liu, supra note 1
at 33; Child Pornography Prevention Act § 121, 110 Stat. at 3009-27.
129.
Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 234, 258.
130.
Id. at 256, 258; Hudson Jr., supra note 4.
131.
Hudson Jr., supra note 4.
132.
Id.; Child Pornography Prevention Act § 121, 110 Stat. at 3009–26.
133.
Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 261, 265.
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are portrayals of teenage sexual activity as well as sexual relations between
teenagers and adults.134 Such films would likely fall under some of the Act’s
prohibited content.135 In addition, the Court distinguished its decision from
that of Ferber’s, noting that virtual child pornography records no actual crime
and therefore creates no victims.136 The issue of morphing was not fully
considered, as the respondents had not challenged that specific provision in
the Act.137 However, the Court’s dicta indicated that morphed child
pornography still implicated real children and therefore was more aligned with
the images presented in Ferber.138 Whether this comparison meant that
morphed child pornography was also unprotected by the First Amendment was
not made clear.139 Justice O’Connor concurred in part in regards to the CPPA
being unconstitutional when applied to material containing youthful-looking
actors.140 However, she dissented in part, acknowledging that there was a clear
concern for the rapidly advancing technological tools being used to create
virtual child pornography and that the CPPA’s ban on virtual child
pornography was not overbroad.141 Justice Scalia also agreed with
O’Connor’s opinion that the CPPA’s ban on child pornography was not
overbroad.142
3.

The PROTECT Act

The Court’s decision in Ashcroft was nothing short of controversial.143
For some, the decision meant that free speech and the First Amendment were
being protected to the fullest extent.144 For others, the Court’s decision left
questions on the definitive legality of virtual child pornography.145 In response
to the decision in Ashcroft, Congress considered a more narrowly tailored
approach to the provisions struck down in the CPPA.146 On April 03, 2003,
134.
Id. at 248.
135.
Id. at 247–48.
136.
Id. at 250; see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 748 (1982).
137.
Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 242.
138.
Id. at 242.
139.
See id.
140.
Id. at 261 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Child
Pornography Prevention Act § 121, 110 Stat. at 3009-28.
141.
Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 263–64 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Child Pornography Prevention Act § 121, 110 Stat. at 3009–26.
142.
Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 263, 267 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Child Pornography Prevention Act § 121, 110 Stat. at 3009–26.
143.
Slocum, supra note 59, at 654.
144.
Id; Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 238.
145.
Slocum, supra note 59, at 654.
146.
Id. at 655; see Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. at 238.
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Congress passed an act entitled “Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to
end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003” (“PROTECT Act”),
which sought to correct many of the CPPA’s provisions.147 The Act cleared
up some of the issues that were determined to be First Amendment
violations.148 In regard to the virtual child pornography provisions of the Act,
the PROTECT Act replaced some of the CPPA’s unconstitutional language.149
For example, “appears to be . . . a minor” was replaced with “indistinguishable
from that of a[n] [actual] minor.”150 Thus, the PROTECT Act allowed for the
prosecution of virtual child pornography that was so realistic that it would be
impossible to determine whether the child being used was real or computergenerated.151
Similarly, the Act also defined virtual child pornography in a way that
does not impose on material which may have artistic or literary value.152
Although the new definitions and provisions narrowed prior law, the Act also
broadened prior affirmative defenses to virtual child pornography.153 The
CPPA granted an affirmative defense for cases that involved youthful-looking
actors; however the PROTECT Act grants an affirmative defense for any cases
in which there was no actual child used in the production of the material.154
The Act seemingly portrayed Congress’ new goal of prohibiting virtual child
pornography only to the extent that it will prevent the production of real child
pornography.155 Congress also asserted that child pornography images that
were being trafficked as of 2003 were produced through the actual abuse of
children.156 Some critics of the PROTECT Act’s provision on virtual child
147.
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children
Today Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108–21, § 1(a), 117 Stat. 650, 650; Slocum, supra note 59, at
655.
148.
Hudson Jr., supra note 4; Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end
the Exploitation of Children Today Act, 117 Stat. 650.
149.
Slocum, supra note 59, at 655; Child Pornography Prevention Act, § 121,
110 Stat; Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today
Act, 117 Stat. at 650.
150.
Slocum, supra note 59, at 655–56; Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools
to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003, § 502, 117 Stat. at 678.
151.
See Slocum, supra note 59, at 648; Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools
to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act, 117 Stat. at 650.
152.
See Slocum, supra note 59, at 656; Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools
to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act, 117 Stat. at 650.
153.
See Slocum, supra note 59, at 657; Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools
to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act, 117 Stat. at 650.
154.
See Slocum, supra note 59, at 657–58; Prosecutorial Remedies and Other
Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act, 117 Stat. at 650.
155.
See Slocum, supra note 59, at 658; Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools
to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act, 117 Stat. at 650.
156.
See Slocum, supra note 59, at 658.
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pornography believe that Congress is attempting to remedy an issue that does
not yet exist.157 However, Justice O’Connor’s dissent in Ashcroft notes that
the Court’s cases “do not require Congress to wait for harm to occur before it
can legislate against it.”158
Although the PROTECT Act is able to prohibit some computergenerated images that are indistinguishable from real children and protect
work that is deemed artistically valuable, it still fails to recognize the gray
areas of virtual child pornography where the sexual abuse of real children is
not needed.159 Morphed child pornography is a category which usually does
not implicate the live abuse of real children, but certainly contributes
significant harms to its victims.160 Additionally, the attainability of editing
applications and software has dramatically increased since 2003, to the point
where morphed child pornography can likely be created with the use of just a
smartphone.161 Thus, the PROTECT Act neglects to provide a uniform and
multifaceted approach to the varying areas of virtual child pornography.162
IV.

THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ON MORPHED CHILD PORNOGRAPHY

A.
Arguments Against the First Amendment’s Protection of Morphed
Child Pornography
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit established
morphed child pornography is not afforded First Amendment protection.163
The main argument put forth by the Court had to do with the overwhelming
emotional and reputational harm that morphed child pornography imposes on
victims.164 Although the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
did not answer a First Amendment question, it was still able to establish that

157.
See Slocum, supra note 59, at 665; Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools
to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act, 117 Stat. at 650.
158.
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 264 (2002) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
159.
See Slocum, supra note 59, at 656–57; Prosecutorial Remedies and Other
Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act, 117 Stat. at 650.
160.
See United States v. Mecham, 950 F.3d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 2020), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 139 (2020).
161.
See Sternberg, supra note 27, at 2788.
162.
See Slocum, supra note 59, at 656–57; Prosecutorial Remedies and Other
Tools to end the Exploitation of Children Today Act, 117 Stat. at 650.
163.
United States v. Hotaling, 634 F.3d 725, 730 (2d Cir. 2011).
164.
Id.
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morphed child pornography constitutes an immediate injury to those victims
involved.165
1.

The Second Circuit and Hotaling

In United States v. Hotaling,166 the defendant admitted to possessing
sexually explicit images of six female minors that had been digitally
morphed.167 The heads of the minors had been cropped out of their original
photographs and then superimposed on the images of partially nude bodies of
adult females engaging in sexual conduct.168 One of the photographs
contained the face of the defendant superimposed on a nude male’s body
engaging in sexual intercourse with a female bearing the face of one of the
child victims.169 There were also images of the victims faces that were
superimposed on bodies that were shackled, leashed, and restrained. 170 Some
of the images were taken from pictures of the defendant’s daughters with their
friends.171 The pictures were held in digital index folders and were labeled
with a pornographic website uniform resource locator (“URL”).172
Additionally, the pictures were titled with the victims’ actual names.173 The
defendant asserted that no actual children were ever harmed when he created
the images and that no sexual activity took place.174 He challenged the state
statute as being overbroad and vague.175 Similarly, the defendant claimed the
images were a way for him to enjoy his sexual fantasies without hurting
anyone and therefore, his actions should be protected under the First
Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.176
The court acknowledged the Supreme Court’s ruling in Ferber, citing
the government’s compelling interest in protecting minors from the emotional
trauma of child pornography.177 In the same manner, the court acknowledged
dicta brought forth by the Supreme Court in Ashcroft, which indicates that
morphed images, although technically considered virtual child pornography,
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Doe v. Boland (In re Boland), 946 F.3d 335, 341–42 (6th Cir. 2020).
634 F.3d 725 (2d Cir. 2011).
Id. at 727.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hotaling, 634 F.3d at 727.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 727, 729.
Id. at 727.
Hotaling, 634 F.3d at 727.
Id. at 728–729; New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 748 (1982).
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more adequately resembled the images discussed in Ferber.178 In other words,
morphed images still include real children and therefore, still pose a threat to
the overall emotional and reputational security of children.179 Ultimately, the
court reasoned that the photographs did implicate the recognizable faces of
minors and therefore caused great psychological and reputational harm to
those victims.180 Thus, sexually explicit images that bear the faces of
identifiable children are not afforded protection under the First Amendment.181
2.

The Sixth Circuit and Boland

In Doe v. Boland,182 the defendant was an attorney and expert witness
who was working as a technology expert for individuals that were charged
with the possession of child pornography.183 In an attempt to make the
argument that children in pornographic images were indistinguishable from
computer-generated children, the defendant took online images of two young
girls and morphed them to create images of the two girls engaging in sexual
acts. 184 Ultimately, his argument was that if he could easily create these
doctored images, then certainly his clients could have downloaded doctored
material as well.185 The defendant presented his images in federal court as an
expert witness and was subsequently told by a judge to delete the images.186
Instead, he kept the images and called federal prosecutors in his hometown to
determine if the images were in fact illegal.187 Ultimately, he was found
criminally and civilly liable for the images.188 The defendant claimed he did
not intend to willfully or maliciously injure the minors, but instead he was
simply creating images that would be used as exhibits in court.189
The court reasoned that there is a substantial certainty of injury when
the faces of identifiable minors are used for the purpose of creating morphed
child pornography.190 It was noted that there is a legal presumption of injury
178.
U.S. at 238.
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Hotaling, 634 F.3d at 729; Ferber, 458 U.S. at 748; Free Speech Coal., 535
Hotaling, 634 F.3d at 729–30.
Id.
Id. at 730.
946 F.3d 335 (6th Cir. 2020).
Id. at 337.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re Boland, 946 F.3d at 337.
See id. at 338.
Id. at 341.
See id. at 341–42.
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when a child’s identity is used in morphed pornography.191 Thus, the injury
begins at the moment the images are created.192 The court drew similarities
between morphed child pornography and defamatory statements, stating that
both occur when an individual acts with the knowledge that substantial injury
or harm is likely to occur.193 Consequently, the court agreed that the
presumption of injury in morphed child pornography was great.194 It is clear
that whatever causes great injury to minors cannot, on its face, be protected
under the First Amendment.195 The court held that the defendant had
substantial knowledge that his actions would cause injury and harm to the
victims.196 Therefore, the defendant could not be released from his charge.197
B.
Arguments in Support of the First Amendment’s Protection of
Morphed Child Pornography
1.

The Eighth Circuit and Anderson

In United States v. Anderson,198 the defendant sent unsolicited
sexually explicit images to his half-sister’s eleven-year-old daughter.199 One
of the pictures he had sent depicted an adult male and an adult female engaging
in sexual intercourse with the caption: “this is what we will do.”200 The
defendant had superimposed his own face onto that of the male’s body and the
victim’s face onto the female’s body.201 Ultimately, he admitted that he
created the image and sent it to the victim’s Facebook account.202 The
defendant moved to dismiss his charges on the basis that the statute was
unconstitutionally overbroad under the First Amendment.203
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
reasoned that only visual depictions produced through the sexual abuse of a
child fell under unprotected speech.204 Although the court noted the decision
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id. at 342.
In re Boland, 946 F.3d at 342.
Id. at 338–39.
See id. at 342.
See id. at 341–42.
Id. at 342.
In re Boland, 946 F.3d at 342.
759 F.3d 891 (8th Cir. 2014).
Id. at 893.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Anderson, 759 F.3d at 893.
Id. at 894.
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in Ferber, the understanding was that Ferber focused on child pornography
that was intrinsically related to child abuse and criminal conduct.205
Furthermore, because no minor was abused in the production of the
defendant’s content, nor was there historical or Supreme Court case law
addressing this issue, the defendant’s material fell under protected speech.206
In order to understand the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Anderson, it is
important to acknowledge the cases that drove the opposing party’s arguments
and the court’s decisional reasoning.207
The state argued that Anderson was identical to United States v.
Bach.208 In Bach, the Eighth Circuit heard a case involving a morphed image
which superimposed the face of a minor on the body of a minor posing in a
sexually explicit manner.209 Because the underlying image was still the body
of a minor, the court reasoned that the material could not be protected by the
First Amendment.210 The underlying image was a record of criminal activity
against a child, notwithstanding the face that was superimposed upon it.211
However, the defense suggested that Anderson and Bach are completely
different.212 The main difference outlined by the defense was that in Anderson
the underlying images were of adults engaging in sexual conduct, whereas in
Bach, the underlying image was of a real child.213 Thus, no children were
attempted to be portrayed in creating the images in Anderson.214 Without the
presence of some sort of child abuse in the material, the defense advanced the
opinion that the images in Anderson are protected by the First Amendment.215
The Court in Anderson used the Supreme Court’s reasoning in United
States v. Stevens216 to support its argument that child pornography is only
unprotected by the First Amendment when it displays the criminal abuse of
children.217 Additionally, the Court used Stevens to explain that the First
Amendment’s protections do not rely on a balancing test of costs versus
benefits.218 Instead, it reasoned that First Amendment protection depends
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Anderson, 759 F.3d at 894; New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 748 (1982).
See Anderson, 759 F.3d at 894.
See id.
400 F.3d 622 (8th Cir. 2005); see Anderson, 759 F.3d at 894.
Bach, 400 F.3d at 624, 632.
Id. at 632.
Bach, 400 F.3d at 632.
Id.; Anderson, 759 F.3d at 895.
Anderson, 759 F.3d at 895; Bach, 400 F.3d at 632.
Anderson, 759 F.3d at 895.
Id. at 894–95.
559 U.S. 460 (2010).
Anderson, 759 F.3d at 894.
Id; Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 at 464.
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primarily on whether the content in question has been historically or
traditionally prohibited by the courts.219 In Stevens, the Supreme Court held
that animal cruelty content was not automatically excluded from the First
Amendment’s protection, as there is no evidence of historical prohibitions
against the depictions of animal cruelty.220 Although Stevens focused on
animal cruelty videos, the Eighth Circuit chose to apply this rhetoric to its
morphed child pornography question in Anderson.221 The court held that
morphed child pornography should not be excluded from First Amendment
protection because it lacks traditional and historical prohibition in the law.222
Specifically, morphed child pornography does not present the abuse of real
children—which has historically been required for First Amendment
exemption—therefore, morphed child pornography should fall within the
realm of protected speech.223 The court expressed that morphing attempts to
portray a minor, such as the case in Bach, and would thus qualify as an
exemption from First Amendment protection because it would display the
abuse of a child.224 However, morphing that does not implicate a real minor,
such as images of adults engaging in sexual relations with superimposed faces
of children, would not qualify as an exception under the reasoning in
Anderson.225
V.

THE CASE OF UNITED STATES V. MECHAM

In United States v. Mecham, the Fifth Circuit asked whether the First
Amendment protects morphed child pornography.226 The court notes that real
child pornography goes unprotected under the First Amendment and that
pornography created with youthful-looking adult actors or completely
computer-generated children is protected.227
However, the court
acknowledges how morphed child pornography usually falls between these
established categories.228
In Mecham, the defendant took his computer to a repair shop where it
was discovered that he had used it to store thousands of images of nude adults
219.
Id.
220.
Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 at 481, 482.
221.
Id.; Anderson, 759 F.3d at 894.
222.
Anderson, 759 F.3d at 894.
223.
See id.
224.
Id. at 895; Bach, 400 F.3d at 632.
225.
Anderson, 759 F.3d at 895–96.
226.
See United States v. Mecham, 950 F.3d 257, 260 (5th Cir. 2020), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 139 (2020).
227.
Id.
228.
Id.
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with the faces of children superimposed onto them.229 After a search of his
home, police obtained over 30,000 files of morphed child pornography.230 All
the images found used the faces of the defendant’s grandchildren.231 The
defendant admitted that he had superimposed the faces of his four
granddaughters onto the bodies of adults engaging in sexual intercourse.232
The defendant claimed he had created the images and videos in anger after his
daughter prohibited him from having any contact with his granddaughters.233
The victims were of the ages of four, five, ten, and sixteen.234
The defendant had managed to email some of these videos to his oldest
granddaughter.235 One of the videos showed the sixteen-year-old victim’s face
superimposed onto the body of a female engaging in sexual intercourse with a
male.236 The defendant had superimposed his own face onto the body of that
male.237 This video also depicted explicit and disturbing animated scenes of
the defendant ejaculating on the victim.238 Another video contained a photo
montage of images of the five-year-old victim’s face cropped onto the bodies
of females engaging in various sexual acts.239
The defendant contended that the charges against him should be
dismissed because morphed child pornography is protected under the First
Amendment.240 Furthermore, the defendant argued that he could not be
charged because no children were sexually abused in the production of the
content.241
The court recognized that morphed child pornography is closer in
relation to real child pornography, as the face of an identifiable minor is being
used to depict sexual content.242 Additionally, the Fifth Circuit did not neglect
to review the arguments on both sides of the circuit split.243 The court
emphasized the importance of the lower court’s actions during times when the
Supreme Court’s caselaw on an issue is not yet solidified.244 Lower courts
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
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Mecham, 950 F.3d at 260.
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Id.
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Id.
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must not attempt to guess what the Supreme Court might decide, but instead
should look to the underlying concerns of the Supreme Court in applicable
past decisions.245
For example, both Ferber and Ashcroft focused on reputational and
emotional harm to children.246 The Court wanted to address Stevens, as this
case supported the Eighth Circuit’s decision in Anderson and had not been
addressed by the Second or Sixth Circuits.247 Stevens put forth the argument
that the First Amendment’s protections are not decided on a cost-benefit
analysis or balancing test.248 The court in Mecham found this statement
irrelevant, stating that the Second and Sixth Circuits did not reach their
decisions from a simple balancing testing of morphed child pornography, but
instead reached their decisions based on their interest in preventing the
reputational and emotional harm of children.249 In the same manner, the court
noted that Stevens focused on depictions of animal cruelty and only mentioned
child pornography in passing.250 This rhetoric alone cannot override the
precedent of the court’s concerns regarding child pornography.251
Additionally, Stevens cannot reliably be used as the only justification for First
Amendment protection of morphed child pornography, as it makes no mention
of the emotional and psychological harm to children that the Supreme Court
is trying to prevent.252 If Stevens was attempting to make a significant
doctrinal development of child pornography, it would not have been done in a
case about animal cruelty videos.253
Finally, the court proposed that defining child pornography as only
images that exhibit the real criminal abuse of a child would not only limit the
prohibition of morphed child pornography, but of real child pornography as
well.254 The definition of real child pornography does not limit itself to
pictures and videos depicting real child abuse.255 On the contrary, real child
pornography can be an image of a child in which genitals are exposed or even
a cropped image of a child’s genitals in which the child’s face is not even
245.
Id.
246.
See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 265; New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758
(1982); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 249 (2002).
247.
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 469–71 (2010); see Mecham, 950
F.3d at 264–65; Anderson, 759 F.3d at 891.
248.
See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 264–65; Stevens, 559 U.S. at 464.
249.
See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 265.
250.
Id. at 265–66; see Stevens, 559 U.S. at 469, 471.
251.
See Mecham, 950 F.3d at 265–66.
252.
See id.; Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471.
253.
Mecham, 950 F.3d at 266; see Stevens, 559 U.S. at 465–66, 471.
254.
Mecham, 950 F.3d at 267.
255.
Id. at 266.
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shown.256 This broad definition of child pornography has been used for
decades to prosecute individuals even when there is no evidence that physical
sexual contact occurred.257 The court did not believe that the decision in
Ferber was meant to constrict the definition of child pornography to only
images which depict abuse, rather, it was only one of the Supreme Court’s
rationales in reaching its decision.258 Regarding morphed child pornography,
the Fifth Circuit recognized that Ashcroft and every other circuit case to
address this issue had established that there was indeed a significant threat to
the psychological well-being of children affected.259 Ultimately, the court
disagreed with the defendant’s claim that morphed child pornography is
protected under the First Amendment.260
VI.

CONCLUSION

The court in Anderson mistakenly interpreted the Supreme Court’s
rhetoric in Stevens.261 Stevens differentiated the issue of child pornography
from the issue of animal crushing videos, admitting that child pornography is
always a special case due to its historical establishment as a long standing First
Amendment exception.262 Simply, the Court in Stevens was describing its
inability to create another First Amendment exception category for animal
crush videos, as there would be no historical support for such a ruling.263
Although the Court in Stevens also suggests that there is little need for a costbenefit analysis in child pornography due to its already established history, it
is unlikely that the Court was envisioning the more controversial and gray area
category of morphed child pornography.264 A cost-benefit analysis would
likely be essential for such a contested issue.265 Such an analysis would show
that morphed child pornography poses a significant harm to children and
provides little to no benefit to society.266 Under the reasoning in Mecham, if
256.
Id.
257.
Id.
258.
Id.; see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 750–51, 764 (1982).
259.
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 249 (2002); Mecham, 950
F.3d at 267.
260.
Mecham, 950 F.3d at 267.
261.
United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 471 (2010); United States v.
Anderson, 759 F.3d 891, 894 (8th Cir. 2014).
262.
Stevens, 559 U.S. at 471–72.
263.
See id. at 471.
264.
See id.
265.
See Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 236, 251–53 (2002).
266.
United States v. Mecham, 950 F.3d 257, 263–64 (5th Cir. 2020), cert.
denied, 141 S. Ct. 139 (2020).
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a cost-benefit analysis was deemed irrelevant and the concern was solely based
on harm to children that was expressed in Ferber, morphing would still not
fall under protected speech.267
Admittedly, child pornography, whether real, virtual or morphed, is a
difficult topic to address.268 In the past, child sexual abuse was often
ignored.269 However, the new digital age has also provided some sort of
transparency on the true magnitude of this issue.270 It is important to
acknowledge that child sexual abuse content does not always arise out of
situations that were abusive or harmful.271 The production of sexual images
with the use of an identifiable minor constitutes abuse in itself.272
Consequently, American jurisprudence has indicated that the
government has a compelling interest in safeguarding the overall well-being
of our youth.273 It is established that real child pornography causes extreme
psychological and reputational harm to its child victims.274 Virtual child
pornography does not always implicate real children getting abused.275 Thus,
it is also established that non-obscene virtual child pornography is protected
by the First Amendment.276
However, the issue still stands with morphed child pornography.277
When the identities of real children are implicated in the production of
sexually explicit imagery, it would be unreasonable to believe that no harm
has occurred.278 It is essential to acknowledge that child sexual abuse images
do not always arise out of situations of abuse themselves.279 It is quite possible
to be a victim of child pornography without ever even knowing it.280 If we
follow the reasoning in Ferber, the Court’s concern was exclusively on the
direct and indirect harm that pornography has on the psychological,
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reputational, and emotional well-being of child victims.281 These same harms
are present with morphed images as well.282 The circulation of morphed
images is simply another way of disguising exploitation and child abuse.283
The importance of free speech cannot be used to justify harm and abuse to
children.284 If we are a nation that refuses to protect the sanctity of our youth
under the guise of freedom, then we are inherently saying those freedoms are
more important than the lives of the people that they were designed to
protect.285 The Supreme Court’s guidance to lower courts on how to address
this issue uniformly is insufficient and current legislation has failed to cover
the plethora of issues that may arise from virtual child pornography.286 The
absence of clear precedent calls for judicial review at the Supreme Court level
that aligns with the current majority view of the circuits.287
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See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 756–57; Mecham, 950 F.3d at 262.
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